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SOLVING TAXPATRIATION:  
“REALIZING” IT TAKES MORE THAN 
AMENDING THE ALTERNATIVE TAX 
I. INTRODUCTION 
liver Wendell Holmes once said, “[t]axes are what we pay for a 
civilized society . . . .”1 As the U.S. Constitution states, tax reve-
nue allows Congress to “pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and the general Welfare of the United States.”2 Taxes fund public 
goods such as police and fire departments, highway construction, public 
education and scientific research.3 Taxes also fund administrative activi-
ties such as the enforcement of laws to protect our natural resources and 
the environment.4 Without taxation, governments would have to resort to 
either the issuance of debt or the issuance of additional currency as the 
means to fund public programs and governmental activities.5 Despite the 
myriad benefits, some people are willing to travel great lengths to reduce 
or eliminate their taxes. 
For some, the benefits of avoiding U.S. taxes are great enough that 
they are willing to renounce their U.S. citizenship to do so.6 How should 
our society react to expatriation to avoid taxation?7 The renunciation of 
                                                                                                             
 1. Sharon C. Nantell, A Cultural Prospective on American Tax Policy, 2 CHAP. L. 
REV. 33, 34 (1999), citing Compania General de Tobacos de Filipinas v. Collector of 
Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 3. U.S. Treasury Department Fact Sheet, http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-
sheets/taxes/economics.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. One example is Michael Dingman, chairman of a company which makes aero-
space and industrial products. Mr. Dingman is now a citizen of the Bahamas which has a 
low tax rate. Mr. Dingman renounced his U.S. citizenship in June of 1994 because he had 
been living in the Bahamas in one form or another since 1964 and wanted a pleasant 
place to raise his three children. Mr. Dingman claims avoidance of U.S. taxes was not a 
factor in his decision to expatriate. However, his opinion is that if he is investing money 
in other countries, he should not have to pay U.S. taxes on money he invests because no 
other country taxes this way. Mr. Dingman also does not want his heirs to pay estate 
taxes on money he has already paid taxes on when he dies. Karen De Witt, Some of Rich 
Find a Passport Lost is a Fortune Gained, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995 (Late Edition), at 
A1. 
 7. For purposes of this Note, the terms “expatriation” will refer to the legal renuncia-
tion of one’s citizenship by an individual and “expatriate” will refer to one who has re-
nounced his or her citizenship. Corporate expatriation, including corporate inversion, is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
O 
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U.S. citizenship to save taxes is like flag burning: it offends people.8 
However, though offensive to patriotic Americans, flag burning is pro-
tected by the Constitution.9 What restrictions can or should be placed on 
the ability to expatriate?10 
As discussed, taxes fund the cost of maintaining a civilized society.11 
Loss of tax dollars from expatriates means the loss of tax revenue to fund 
public and governmental programs.12 But as Judge Learned Hand com-
mented: 
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody 
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty 
to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not 
voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is 
mere cant.13 
However, moral sentiments and patriotic principles seem to be a driv-
ing force behind efforts to curb “taxpatriation.”14 Recent congressional 
                                                                                                             
 8. Alice Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1996). 
 9. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning as a form of 
free speech under the First Amendment). 
 10. Expatriation is a right recognized under international law. Substantial restrictions 
placed on the right of expatriation would probably be a violation of human rights. Abreu, 
supra note 8, at 1127 n.150 (recognizing the right to leave one’s own country (codified in 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217A, art. 13, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 
1948) (recognizing the right to leave and return to one’s home country). But see Abreu, 
supra note 8, at 1127 n.150 (asserting that international law does not protect right to ex-
patriate). 
 11. See supra note 1. 
 12. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text for examples of public and govern-
mental programs funded by taxes. The loss of tax revenue from those most likely to expa-
triate to avoid taxes (i.e., individuals in the upper echelons of society with wealth esti-
mated in the millions or billions of dollars) constitutes the largest base of taxable dollars. 
See supra note 6. 
 13. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dis-
senting). 
 14. “Taxpatriation” refers to the act of renouncing one’s citizenship to avoid taxes. 
The term “taxpatriation” comes from Robert Lenzner, And Don’t Come Back: U.S. Citi-
zens Who Renounce Their Citizenship for Tax Purposes Face Obstacles, FORBES, Nov. 
18, 1996, at 44. Although loss of revenue is probably the greatest concern, the Congres-
sional debate regarding taxpatriation seems fueled by anger over the ease former citizens 
have with severing allegiances and ties to their home country. While speaking on the 
floor of the House, Representative Neil Abercrombie passionately argued: 
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revisions to the Internal Revenue Code make avoiding U.S. taxes more 
difficult, but they still fall short of achieving the ultimate goal—stopping 
tax-motivated expatriation.15 
This Note examines recent amendments the United States made to pro-
visions dealing with expatriation to avoid taxes and their ineffectiveness 
in keeping capital within the United States. Part I examines the history of 
taxation as well as expatriation and the current system of taxation em-
ployed by the United States. Part II explores the potential tax benefits 
gained from expatriating and the procedure to formally renounce citizen-
ship. This section also discusses previous efforts by Congress to curb 
expatriation. Lastly, this section will examine the American Jobs Crea-
tion Act of 2004 and its intended objectives to ease administration and 
increase enforcement of provisions dealing with expatriation to avoid 
taxation. Part III explores the weaknesses still present in the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 amendments to Internal Revenue Code section 
                                                                                                             
Why should I give two hoots about somebody that wants to give up their U.S. 
citizenship and shift their income to another country . . . ?  It has been brought 
up about double taxation. I say, “You can triple or quadruple tax them as far as 
I’m concerned, run it up to a hundred percent if they want to give up their citi-
zenship because they don’t want to pay their taxes.” . . . How can you say that 
we should all do our share in America, including making all the kids, and the 
elderly people, and everybody else, have to contribute to the deficit, to bring it 
down, and at the same time allow these sleazy bums, who don’t want to pay 
their taxes, to leave this country, and renounce their citizenship, and expect me 
to have one iota of sympathy for them. 
Abreu, supra note 8, at 1122–23, quoting 141 CONG. REC. H3845 (1995) (statement by 
Rep. Abercrombie) (omissions in original). In another instance, before the enactment of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Representative Charles 
Rangel wanted to publish the names of taxpatriates as a form of punishment or as a deter-
rent to individuals who “care so little about [their U.S.] citizenship that they would flee in 
order to avoid taxes.”  Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax 
Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax 
Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 889 (2004), quoting 141 CONG. REC. H3996 (1995) (state-
ment by Rep. Rangel). Currently, section 6039G of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
[hereinafter I.R.C.] provides that the names of people who have expatriated within the 
meaning of section 877(a) of the I.R.C. will be listed in the Federal Register. I.R.C. § 
6039G(d) (West 2004). Since January 2000, 2874 people have expatriated. See discussion 
infra note 155. 
 15. See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 804–806, 
118 Stat. 1418 (2004). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 changes the subjective 
standards for determining whether expatriation is tax-motivated. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 111, 116–18. However, the objective standards created by the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 do not provide the best solution. See infra Part III. 
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877 and the alternative tax regime as a means for deterring tax-motivated 
expatriation. In furtherance of Congressional objectives and goals, this 
Note will propose a mark-to-market regime, which “realizes” accrued 
gains in property, as a better solution for eliminating purely tax-
motivated expatriation while simultaneously upholding the inherent right 
of expatriation for those who truly want to renounce citizenship. 
A. History of Taxation 
In the 1800s, the federal government limited taxes to tariffs on im-
ported goods.16 The bulk of taxes imposed by state and local govern-
ments were mainly on real property supplemented by excise taxes on 
items such as slaves, carriages, and personal property.17 As the United 
States shifted from an agrarian economy to an industrialized one, devel-
opments in the financial and social systems were reflected in contempo-
raneous changes to personal wealth. The composition of individual es-
tates has evolved from being mainly real property to including commer-
cial paper, stocks and other evidences of debt, to becoming primarily 
income.18 In short, the wealth of individual Americans came from 
sources untouched by the federal government’s import tax or the prop-
erty tax imposed by state and local governments.19 In response to an eco-
nomic crunch caused by financing the Civil War, the federal government 
turned towards taxing income.20 This first tax on income evolved into our 
current tax system, which includes exemptions, deductions and the pro-
gressive rate structure.21 After many battles over the federal govern-
ment’s ability to tax, the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
was passed in 1913 allowing Congress to establish a federal system of 
taxation on “income from whatever source derived.”22 Recently, individ-
ual income tax receipts equaled $927.2 billion in 200523 (43 percent of 
                                                                                                             
 16. See Nantell, supra note 1, at 40–42. 
 17. Id. at 41–42, citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185 
(2d ed. 1985). 
 18. Id. at 42 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nantell credits the income tax law of 1862 with providing the basic structure for 
today’s current tax system. Id. at 43. The progressive rate structure means a system of 
taxation which imposes higher rates of tax at higher levels of income. See generally 
I.R.C. § 1. 
 22. Nantell, supra note 1, at 38; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. See also I.R.C. § 22 (West 
1913) (current version at I.R.C. § 61 (West 2006)). 
 23. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the U.S. Government for 
2007, Table S-11 (Receipts by Source—Summary), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
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receipts by source)24 and are estimated to equal $997.5 billion for 200625 
(43.6 percent of receipts by source).26 
B. The Current United States System of Taxation 
The United States is among the minority in its system of taxation.27 It 
utilizes the “worldwide taxation” system, which taxes persons based on 
citizenship.28 In contrast, most other nations around the world utilize a 
system of “territorial taxation,” which taxes persons based on resi-
dency.29 U.S. citizens are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide 
income regardless of its source.30 For an increasingly globalized society, 
this could have serious implications since the income tax rate for indi-
viduals can be as high as 35 percent.31 Additionally, nonresident citizens 
                                                                                                             
budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/tables.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). The estate and gift tax 
receipts equaled $24.8 billion in 2005 and are estimated to equal $27.5 billion for 2006. 
Id. 
 24. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Historical Tables for 2007, Table 22 
(Percentage Composition of Receipts by Source: 1934-2011), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). The total receipts for the 
federal government in 2005 equaled $2,135.9 billion and is estimated to equal $2,285.5 
billion for 2006. Id. tbl. 2.1 (Receipts by Source: 1934–2011). 
 25. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 23, tbl. S-11. 
 26. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 24, tbl. 2.2. 
 27. Hale E. Sheppard, Perpetuation of the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: U.S. 
International Tax Policy, Political Reality, and the Necessity of Understanding How the 
Two Intertwine, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 727, 730 (2000). 
 28. See Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate 
Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 44, 79 (2000); Can-
dace Carmichael, Foreign Sales Corporations—Subsidies, Sanctions, and Trade Wars, 35 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 151, 163–64 (2002) (noting that neither the United States nor 
countries utilizing the territorial taxation system employ a “pure” system of taxation. 
Most countries employ a combination of the two concepts to avoid double taxation of 
income). 
 29. Carmichael, supra note 28, at 163–64. 
 30. Kenneth D. Heath, The Symmetries of Citizenship: Welfare, Expatriate Taxation, 
and Stakeholding, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533, 545 (1999). See also Carmichael, supra note 
28, at 164. See generally I.R.C. § 61 (defining “income”). Although outside the scope of 
this Note, it should be mentioned that the U.S. Estate Tax also applies to the worldwide 
estate of U.S. citizens regardless of its source. I.R.C. § 2001. 
 31. I.R.C. § 1, amended by Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979. This tax rate is 
applicable to individuals whose taxable income exceeds $336,550. Additionally, upon 
death, transfers of property will incur an additional estate tax with a ceiling of 46 percent 
in 2006 to decline to 45 percent for the years 2007 through 2009. Id. § 2001(c)(2). There 
will be no estate tax for the year 2010 and the maximum rate will return to 50 percent in 
2011. Id. §§ 2001(c)(1). 
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may be subject to double taxation on income derived from their host 
country due to the conflict between the two systems of taxation.32 
In contrast, nonresident noncitizens33 only pay U.S. taxes on U.S.-
source income or income connected to the conduct of trade or business 
within the United States.34 Nonresident noncitizens are taxed at a flat rate 
of 30 percent for income not connected with U.S. business35 or at the 
same progressive rate structure applicable to U.S. citizens for income 
connected with a U.S. business.36 Nonresident noncitizens are able to 
avoid many of the burdensome taxes imposed on U.S. persons.37 Status 
                                                                                                             
 32. Renee S. Liu, Note, The Expatriate Exclusion Clause: An Inappropriate Response 
to Relinquishing Citizenship for Tax Avoidance Purposes, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 689, 694 
(1998). See Carmichael, supra note 28, at 165–66. A person’s country of citizenship is 
referred to as their “home” country while the country where the person resides, derives 
income or owns property is referred to as the “host” country if different from their 
“home” country. The risk of double taxation also extends to a nonresident citizen’s estate 
if the estate includes property situated within the host country. This double taxation may 
be abated or eliminated by income tax and estate tax treaties with other nations. As of 
April 30, 2004, the United States had fifty-four income tax treaties (one of which is the 
Commonwealth of Independent States which consists of the countries of Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
to bring the total number of countries the United States has income tax treaties with to 
sixty-two). See Department of Treasury Publication 901, U.S. Tax Treaties, at 48, tbl. 3 
(List of Tax Treaties) (May 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p901.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006). Treaties serve to lessen or maintain the tax burden, never to 
raise the tax burden. Ernest R. Larkins, U.S. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Plan-
ning: A Primer, 18 VA. TAX REV. 133, 189 (1998). However, some U.S. tax treaties con-
tain “savings clauses” which reserves a country’s right to tax its citizens or residents not-
withstanding the existence of the treaty. Id. at 186. Moreover, tax burdens on U.S. citi-
zens living abroad may decrease if they qualify for foreign income tax credits on foreign 
income taxes paid on income earned outside the United States. Heath, supra note 30, at 
545 n.95. See I.R.C. §§ 901–07. 
 33. Expatriated Americans living abroad are considered nonresident noncitizens. See 
Heath, supra note 30, at 545. 
 34. I.R.C. § 871; Heath, supra note 30, at 545. The United States does not tax non-
resident aliens on income derived from a source outside the United States. See generally 
I.R.C. § 871. Resident aliens are taxed comparably to U.S. individuals. See I.R.C. § 1; 
Heath, supra note 30, at 545. 
 35. I.R.C. § 871(a). Income not connected with U.S. business is basically income 
from U.S. sources. These sources include interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, pre-
miums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and the like, generated 
from within the United States. See generally id. § 871(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
 36. See id. § 871(b). This means conducting business within the United States. More-
over, the federal estate tax is not imposed on nonresident noncitizens except for assets 
within the United States. Id. § 2107. 
 37. See infra Table 1 for a comparison. 
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as a nonresident noncitizen allows an expatriate to avoid any U.S. tax 
liability on foreign source income and capital gains tax on appreciated 
U.S. securities by selling them and reinvesting outside the United 
States.38 Consequently, the U.S. tax structure creates an incentive for 
many wealthy American individuals to expatriate for tax-avoidance pur-
poses.39 
C. The Battle Over Expatriation 
To trace the history of expatriation, one must turn to English common 
law. In recognizing the English doctrine of “perpetual allegiance,” U.S. 
common law disallowed renunciation of U.S. citizenship.40 “Perpetual 
allegiance” espoused the principle that an individual had no legal right to 
renounce his or her sovereign.41 In the mid-nineteenth century, however, 
the United States, perhaps recognizing the inconsistency of admitting 
expatriates of other countries while disallowing expatriation of its own 
citizens,42 enacted the Expatriation Act of 1868.43 Consequently, the 
United States formally acknowledged the freedom to renounce one’s 
citizenship as “a natural and inherent right of all people indispensable to 
the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”44 
Since then, the roots of the right to expatriate have grown deep in Ameri-
can soil.45 Only recently has Congress promulgated legislation to curb 
expatriation for tax-avoidance purposes.46 
                                                                                                             
 38. Heath, supra note 30, at 545. Nonresident noncitizens are also not subject to the 
U.S. Estate Tax on their estates except on property situated within the United States. 
I.R.C. § 2101. 
 39. Heath, supra note 30, at 546. 
 40. Jerry R. Dagrella, Wealthy Americans Planning to Renounce Their Citizenship to 
Save on Taxes Have a New Problem to Consider: This Time Congress Means Business, 
13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 363, 364 (2000), citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308 
(1915) (recognizing the perpetual allegiance rule from England). 
 41. Dagrella, supra note 40, at 365. 
 42. Heath, supra note 30, at 543. 
 43. Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223 (1868). 
 44. Heath, supra note 30, at 543, citing Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223, pmbl. 
The U.S. Supreme Court also recognized that a citizen has a “constitutional right to re-
main a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”  Da-
grella, supra note 40, at 368 n.40, citing Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967). 
 45. This is evidenced by the consideration taken by Congress in fashioning a regime 
to tax individuals who wish to renounce citizenship by employing objective standards and 
to allow individuals to cut all ties with the United States and completely renounce citi-
zenship if not done primarily for tax avoidance reasons. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 108TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REVIEW OF THE PRESENT—LAW TAX AND 
IMMIGRATION TREATMENT OF RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND TERMINATION OF 
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In the early 1990s, heavy media coverage familiarized Americans with 
tax-motivated expatriation.47 Commentators and proponents of stronger 
expatriation laws appealed to people’s sense of patriotism and loyalty to 
the United States by emotionally charging citizens who expatriate to 
avoid taxes as “financial draft evaders”48 or “Billionaire Benedict Ar-
nolds.”49 In 1996, Congress responded to the growing uneasiness over 
“taxpatriating”50 by passing key provisions for dealing with the avoid-
ance of income tax in two pieces of legislation. The first, the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), amended provi-
sions of Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 877 which governs tax-
motivated expatriation.51 The amended provision taxes income of expa-
triates as if they were still U.S. citizens for ten years following the date 
                                                                                                             
LONG-TERM RESIDENCY (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-
03.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 2003 JCT Report]. 
 46. Congress first enacted the alternative tax regime in 1966 when it passed the For-
eign Investors Tax Act. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 76, citing Pub. L. No. 89-809. 
The United States is also not alone in its taxation of expatriates. Eritrea, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden and others all impose some 
form of taxation on former residents. Liu, supra note 32, at 700, citing STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ISSUES PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS TO 
MODIFY THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION, at B4–B7 (Comm. Print 1995). See also 
2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 140–52 (Summary of Other Countries’ Taxation of 
Citizenship Relinquishment, Residency Termination, and Immigration). 
 47. Several articles spurred the debate regarding taxpatriation. See generally Lenzner, 
supra note 14; James W. Michaels, Editorial, You Can’t Take It (All) With You, FORBES, 
Mar. 13, 1995; Robert Lenzner & Philippe Mao, The New Refugees: Americans Who 
Give Up Citizenship to Save on Taxes, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 131; DeWitt, supra 
note 6; Brigid McMenamin, Flight Capital: Avoiding U.S. Taxes By Renouncing Citizen-
ship, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1994, at 55. 
 48. Michael Kingsley, Love It or Leave It, TIME, Nov. 28, 1994, at 96. 
 49. During a House discussion regarding the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, Representative Neil Abercrombie referred to billionaires who 
expatriated to avoid taxes as, “Benedict Arnolds who would sell out their citizenship, sell 
out their country in order to maintain their wealth. [J]et set[ters] who are able to . . . enjoy 
the full benefits of all the wealth that they have accumulated in the United States of 
America as citizens, and renounce.”  Abercrombie Decries Recession of Expatriate Tax 
Provision from Health Deduction Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 11, 1995, available at 95 
TNT 70-27 (Lexis). See also Liu, supra note 32, at 690; Jeffrey M. Colon, Changing U.S. 
Tax Jurisdiction: Expatriates, Immigrants, and the Need for a Coherent Tax Policy, 34 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3 (1997); Kirsch, supra note 14, at 923. 
 50. Michelle Leigh Carter, Note, Giving Taxpatriates the Boot Permanently?: The 
Reed Amendment Unconstitutionally Infringes on the Fundamental Right to Expatriate, 
36 GA. L. REV. 835, 837 (2002), quoting Lenzner, supra note 14, at 44. 
 51. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 511-513, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
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of expatriation if they are found to have expatriated for tax-avoidance 
purposes.52 The second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),53 amended and expanded part of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA)54 to deny expatriates re-entry into the 
United States if the U.S. Attorney General determines that the former 
citizen renounced U.S. citizenship for purposes of avoiding taxes.55 Un-
der the provisions of the IIRIRA, frequently referred to as the “Reed 
Amendment,”56 the “taxpatriate” is deemed “inadmissible”57 alongside 
                                                                                                             
 52. See generally I.R.C. § 877(a) (as amended by HIPAA). The I.R.C. also addresses 
expatriating to avoid estate taxes in section 2107 which imposes U.S. estate taxes for ten 
years following the date of death of the former citizen if it is established that the former 
citizen had a principal purpose of avoiding income taxes as determined under section 
877(a)(2). I.R.C. § 2107(a). 
 53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 
1182, 1481, 1483 (1996). 
 54. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1996). 
 55. INA § 1182(a)(10)(E) (“Any alien who is a former citizen of the United States 
who officially renounces United States citizenship and who is determined by the Attorney 
General to have renounced United States citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation 
by the United States is inadmissible.”); Liu, supra note 32, at 690–91. 
 56. See generally Carter, supra note 50. The Reed Amendment is intended to impose 
a significant direct cost on a tax-motivated expatriate by foreclosing the former citizen’s 
ability to return to the United States. Kirsch, supra note 14, at 896. Representative Reed, 
in proposing the amendment, stated, “in an instrumental way, I would hope in the future 
if those very slick and smart tax lawyers advising their clients about how to avoid their 
taxes suggest expatriation they should also indicate very clearly that the consequences are 
you cannot return at will to the United States.”  Id. (citing Hearing Before the House 
Judiciary Committee: Mark-up of Immigration Legislation, 104th Cong. (Nov. 15, 1995) 
in Fed. News Serv., Nov. 15, 1995, at 50). According to Kirsch, Representative Reed 
introduced this amendment in response to a particular tax-motivated expatriate, Kenneth 
Dart, an owner of Dart Container Company, surrendered his citizenship to avoid U.S. 
taxes and became a citizen of Belize. Kirsch, supra note 14, at 892 n.133. Mr. Dart re-
portedly convinced the Belize government to appoint him as a consular official to the 
United States where he would have opened a consular office in Sarasota, Florida, Mr. 
Dart’s former hometown and city where his family still lived. Id. If Mr. Dart had been 
allowed to enter the United States as a diplomatic representative of Belize, he could have 
resided in there for the entire year without becoming a resident alien for U.S. income tax 
purposes. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A)(i), (5)(B) (West 2000), which exempts for-
eign diplomats and consular officials from the substantial presence test for income tax 
residence). After Representative Reed’s introduction of the Reed Amendment, but before 
it was enacted by HIPAA, Belize withdrew its request to appoint Mr. Dart as a consular 
official. Id. (citing State Dept. Briefing (Apr. 5, 1996), in Fed. News Serv., Apr. 5, 1996). 
 57. The terms “admission” and “admitted” in the IIRIRA supplanted the term “entry” 
in INA section 1101(a)(13) and effectively treated all aliens not “admitted” as applicants 
for admission even if the applicant possessed an immigrant visa issued by a consular 
officer in his or her home country. The visa only constitutes prima facie evidence of ad-
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terrorists,58 former-Nazis,59 international child abductors60 and govern-
ment officials who severely violated religious freedom,61 to name a 
few.62 
More recently, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 (2004 Jobs Act)63 which revised the amendments made by HIPAA 
to ease administration and increase enforcement of the anti-taxpatriation 
provisions within the I.R.C.64 The new provisions are also meant to fur-
ther deter taxpatriating while allowing those who truly wish to sever ties 
with the United States to do so.65 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Income Tax Benefits of Expatriation 
The combined effect of the United States’ current tax structure (i.e., the 
“worldwide taxation” system), and the mechanisms employed by the 
federal government to curb taxpatriation, ensures that this problem will 
remain unless drastic changes occur.66 Table 1 compares the tax treat-
ment of U.S. resident and nonresident citizens versus nonresident non-
citizens.67 As Table 1 demonstrates, in a world surrounded by the territo-
rial taxation system, the United States’ worldwide taxation system re-
wards, rather than discourages taxpatriation.68 
                                                                                                             
missibility and does not preclude a “second look” by inspectors at the port-of-entry. 3 
C.J.S. Aliens § 544 (West 2004). 
 58. See INA § 1182(a)(3)(B). 
 59. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(E). 
 60. See id. § 1182(a)(10)(C). 
 61. See id. §1182(a)(2)(G). 
 62. See generally id. § 1182(a) for a complete list. 
 63. See infra note 108. 
 64. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 204. 
 65. See id. at 204–07. 
 66. Provisions imposing an alternative tax on taxpatriates have existed since 1966. 
See supra note 46. Additionally, the stricter HIPAA provisions dealing with renunciation 
of citizenship for tax avoidance purposes has been in effect since 1996. See supra Part 
I.D. Since then, the problem of taxpatriating has not abated but continued to be a source 
of debate within Congress. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45. See also infra note 106. 
This is a partisan issue with many house Democrats calling for “punishments” of sorts to 
deal with taxpatriation and house Republicans calling for more “neutral” solutions. See 
generally De Witt, supra note 6; Lars-Erik Nelson, The Happiest Billionaires—Abroad, 
NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1995, at A34. 
 67. See infra Table 1. 
 68. The effects are even clearer when comparing income tax rates for U.S. corpora-
tions versus foreign corporations. For U.S. corporations, income originating in the United 
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Table 1 
United States Income Tax Imposed 
Income 
Source Resident     
Citizen 
Nonresident Citizen Nonresident 
Alien 
United States Up to 35%69 
Up to 35%70 plus appli-
cable foreign income tax 30%
71 
Foreign   
Country 
Up to 
35%72 
Up to 35%73 plus appli-
cable foreign income tax 0%
74 
 
                                                                                                             
States is taxed by the United States at a maximum rate of 35 percent. On the other hand, 
income of U.S. corporations originating in a foreign country is taxed by the United States 
at the maximum rate of 35 percent plus the applicable foreign tax rate. Foreign corpora-
tions, on the other hand, while taxed at the 30 percent tax rate for income originating in 
the United States, do not pay foreign taxes on that income. For income originating in a 
foreign country, they pay only the applicable foreign tax rate and no U.S. tax. See gener-
ally I.R.C. §§ 11, 881–882. Furthermore, when an individual factors in the effects of the 
U.S. estate taxes, the benefits become greater. The United States imposes estate tax on 
the worldwide estates of its citizens at a maximum rate of 46 percent in 2006. See gener-
ally id. at § 2001. Comparability of tax rates or even tax systems do not really provide a 
suitable benchmark. Unlike the United States, many developed nations do not impose 
capital gains tax. Michael G. Pfeifer & Joseph S. Henderson, Expatriation: The Ultimate 
Estate Planning Tool?, A.L.I-A.B.A COURSE OF STUDY, Course No. SJ027, Aug. 21–22, 
2003, available at WL SJ027 ALI-ABA 575, 598 n.56. Others, although considered 
“high” tax jurisdictions may impose no estate or inheritance tax or impose taxes at rates 
far below applicable U.S. rates. Id. 
 69. I.R.C. § 1, amended by Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979. 
 70. Id. Nonresident citizens may also be able to exclude foreign earned income up to 
$80,000 and housing costs from their gross income.  Id. § 911. 
 71. Id. § 871(a). This section only applies to income not connected to U.S. business. 
See supra note 35. Tax rates for effectively connected income from the conduct of trade 
or business within the United States are the same progressive tax rates as citizens in 
I.R.C. sections 1 and 55. I.R.C. § 871(b). See supra note 36. A discussion of effectively 
connected income is beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, gain on the sale of U.S. 
real property or income from regular, substantial and continuous profit-oriented activities 
will be considered connected to a trade or business. Eva Farkas-DiNardo, Is the Nation of 
Immigrants Punishing its Emigrants: A Critical Review of the Expatriation Rules Revised 
by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 10 n.11 (2005). 
 72. I.R.C. § 1. In addition, the taxable income may be subject to tax of the source 
country. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. § 871. 
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B. Renunciation of Citizenship by Individuals 
The procedure for expatriation is governed by the INA.75 Section 
1481(a) of the INA outlines actions an individual must undertake to re-
nounce U.S. citizenship.76 An individual must either: naturalize in a for-
eign state,77 formally declare allegiance by oath or affirmation to a for-
eign nation,78 enlist in the military service of another country either as an 
officer or in a state that is engaged in hostilities against the United 
States,79 commit treason,80 renounce citizenship at a U.S. diplomatic or 
consular office,81 or provide renunciation in writing to the Attorney Gen-
eral when the United States is engaged in war.82 Pursuant to statute, a 
U.S. citizen can only renounce her citizenship on foreign territory.83 
C. Previous Efforts to Curb Tax-Motivated Expatriation 
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
As discussed above, HIPAA imposed an alternative tax regime on for-
mer citizens determined by the Attorney General to have expatriated for 
                                                                                                             
 75. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a). 
 77. Id. § 1481(a)(1) (“obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own applica-
tion or upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent, after having attained the age 
of eighteen years”). 
 78. Id. § 1481(a)(2) (“taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal decla-
ration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having at-
tained the age of eighteen years”). 
 79. Id. § 1481(a)(3) (“entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) 
such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons 
serve as a commissioned or noncommissioned officer”). 
 80. Id. § 1481(a)(7) (“committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to 
overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States”). 
 81. Id. § 1481(a)(5) (“making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic 
or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of State”). 
 82. Id. § 1481(a)(6) (“making in the United States a formal written renunciation of 
nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be des-
ignated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war 
and the Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests 
of national defense”). 
 83. Id. § 1483(a) (except as provided under INA § 1481(a)(6)–(7) which provides that 
a former citizen renounces citizenship if he or she commits treason or provides writing to 
the Attorney General renouncing citizenship while the United States is at war). See also 
Liu, supra note 32, at 692. 
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tax-avoidance purposes.84 The alternative tax effectively taxes the expa-
triate for ten years following the date of expatriation.85 HIPAA sets a 
statutory presumption of expatriation for tax-avoidance purposes if the 
former citizen’s “annual net income tax for the period of five taxable 
years ending before the date of the loss of United States citizenship is 
greater than $100,000, or the net worth of the individual as of such date 
is $500,000 or more.”86 Former citizens can contest the statutory pre-
sumption of tax-avoidance.87 However, they bear the burden of showing 
that the expatriation was not tax-motivated.88 I.R.C. section 877(c) (as 
amended by HIPAA) provides that the statutory presumption of tax-
avoidance in section 877(a)(2) (as amended by HIPAA) does not apply if 
the expatriating individual: (1) has dual citizenship;89 (2) is a long-term 
foreign resident; or (3) renounces citizenship before reaching the age of 
majority.90 Additionally, within a year from the date of expatriation, the 
former citizen must appeal the presumption by submitting a ruling re-
quest for the Secretary’s91 determination as to whether avoidance of U.S. 
taxes was one of the principal purposes for the renunciation of citizen-
ship.92 If this procedure is followed, the former citizen is not presumed to 
have expatriated for tax avoidance purposes until the Secretary makes a 
ruling regarding the matter.93 
If the Secretary finds that an individual expatriated to avoid taxes 
within the meaning of section 877(a), the individual must file a statement 
pursuant to I.R.C. section 6039G, to either the Secretary or a competent 
court, with information regarding the expatriated individual’s address of 
                                                                                                             
 84. I.R.C. § 877(b) (as amended by HIPAA). 
 85. See id. § 877(a)(1). 
 86. Id. § 877(a)(2)(A)–(B). For 2006, the annual net income tax is $131,000 for the 
five taxable years before the date of renunciation. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2)(A), amended by 
Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979. The net worth amount is currently $2,000,000 or 
more. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2)(B). See also infra notes 120–21. 
 87. See I.R.C. § 877(c) (as amended by HIPAA). 
 88. See id. § 877. 
 89. The category of dual citizenship is broader than the traditional notion of holding 
citizenship in two countries simultaneously. Under I.R.C. § 877(c)(2)(A) (as amended by 
HIPAA), it includes an individual who became, at birth, a citizen of the United States and 
another country and continues to be a citizen of that country and an individual who be-
comes an citizen of his or her spouse’s or either parents’ country of birth. 
 90. See id. § 877(c)(2)(A)–(C). The age of majority is eighteen and a half years. Id. § 
877(c)(2)(C). 
 91. “Secretary” in the I.R.C. refers to the Secretary of the Treasury or his or her dele-
gate. See id. § 7701(a)(11)(B). 
 92. See id. § 877(c)(1)(B). 
 93. See id. § 877; Liu, supra note 32, at 697. 
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foreign residence, information detailing the assets and liabilities of such 
individual, the foreign country in which the individual is a citizen and the 
taxpayer’s TIN,94 among other requirements.95 The Secretary is then re-
quired to publish the name of the expatriated individual in the Federal 
Register.96 
Another purpose for amending I.R.C. section 877 was “to equalize the 
United States tax burdens of expatriates with their United States tax li-
abilities had they not expatriated.”97 Though much legislation was writ-
ten and many changes were made to stop “taxpatriation,” the provision 
has largely been ineffective due to the scores of exceptions available to 
counter the presumption of tax-motivated expatriation.98 With careful 
planning, even if a citizen considering expatriation does not qualify for 
an exception now, he or she may qualify at a later date.99 
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
The IIRIRA’s amendment to the INA (Reed Amendment) works in 
conjunction with HIPAA’s amendment to the I.R.C.100 The Reed 
Amendment, which denies admission to expatriates who renounced citi-
zenship to avoid taxes, is only invoked after the Attorney General deter-
mines that the citizen expatriated for tax-avoidance reasons under I.R.C. 
section 877 (as amended by HIPAA).101 As discussed above, a section 
877 determination of tax-motivated expatriation is rarely found.102 Addi-
tionally, as of February 2006, the Reed Amendment has never been en-
forced.103 
                                                                                                             
 94. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(41) (as amended by HIPAA) (“TIN” means the identifying 
number assigned to a person under § 6109). 
 95. Id. § 6039G(b). 
 96. Id. § 6039G(e)(3). 
 97. Colon, supra note 49, at 44–45. It may also have been in response to media cov-
erage admonishing “taxpatriation.”  See supra notes 6, 14, 47–48. 
 98. Liu, supra note 32, at 698. See also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45; infra Part 
III.A. 
 99. Liu, supra note 32, at 698. The same goes for avoiding the tax placed upon unre-
alized gains from assets which have appreciated. A patient expatriate who is able to wait 
the ten years before selling his or her assets can defer in part, and avoid in part, the capi-
tal gains tax. Id. at 699. 
 100. Id. at 698. 
 101. INA § 1182(a)(10)(E). 
 102. Carter, supra note 50, at 839. See also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 100. 
 103. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 72. There is also an issue as to the consti-
tutionality of such a provision. See generally Carter, supra note 50. 
2006] TAXPATRIATION 629 
In response to the deficiencies and failures of HIPAA and the IIRIRA, 
Congress authorized the Joint Committee on Taxation to investigate their 
effectiveness.104 In February 2003, the Joint Committee on Taxation pub-
lished its findings.105 As a result, Congress commenced another round of 
legislative drafting.106 As a result of these efforts, many of the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations to increase enforcement, ease the admini-
stration of I.R.C. section 877, and deter expatriation107 are codified in the 
2004 Jobs Act.108 
D. Current Efforts to Reduce Taxpatriation—The American Jobs Crea-
tion Act of 2004 
As Congress’s most recent attempt to curb tax-motivated expatriation, 
the 2004 Jobs Act amends the I.R.C. to remove its shortcomings.109 It 
modifies the provisions enacted by HIPAA and section 877 to generally 
follow the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Taxation 
in its 2003 report.110 First, it institutes objective rules regarding whether a 
U.S. citizen who desires to relinquish citizenship should be subjected to 
the alternative tax regime established by I.R.C. section 877.111 Second, it 
provides a tax-based, instead of immigration-based, set of rules for de-
                                                                                                             
 104. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 1. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally S. 260, 108th Cong. (2003) (Senator Thomas Harkins sponsored 
this bill which introduced a mark-to-market regime to “amend the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 to prevent the continued use of renouncing U.S. citizenship as a device for avoid-
ing U.S. taxes”); S. 1054, 108th Cong. § 340 (2003) (Senator Charles Grassley sponsored 
this bill to reconcile the budget for fiscal year 2004 and included revised tax rules on 
expatriation and also called for a mark-to-market regime). 
 107. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 75. Congress is trying to achieve the goals 
of: (1) expressing official disapproval of tax motivated expatriation; (2) deterring or pun-
ishing tax-motivated expatriation; (3) removing unintended tax incentives from expatria-
tion; (4) taxing appreciation and asset value that accrues while a person is a U.S. citizen 
or resident; and (5) ensuring that individuals cannot enjoy tax benefits that may arise 
from expatriating while maintaining ties to the United States. Id. See also infra notes 
152–53. 
 108. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted). 
 109. See generally American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Jobs Act), Pub. L. No. 
108-357, §§ 801–06 (2004). See also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 72–74 (identify-
ing impediments to effectively removing avoidance of taxes from a former citizen’s deci-
sion to renounce citizenship). 
 110. For the Joint Committee recommendations, see generally 2003 JCT Report, supra 
note 45, at 204 (Part XI: Joint Committee Staff Recommendations). 
 111. See I.R.C. § 877(a)–(b) (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). See also infra Part 
III.B.1; 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 205–08. 
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termining when an individual is no longer a U.S. citizen for federal tax 
purposes.112 Third, the 2004 Jobs Act subjects individuals determined to 
have expatriated to avoid taxes to full U.S. taxation if they return to the 
United States for extended periods of time.113 Lastly, it provides that an 
annual information return114 be filed for each of the ten years following 
expatriation.115 
1. Objective Rules for Determining Applicability of the  
Alternative Tax Regime 
The Joint Committee recommended instituting an objective standard to 
determine whether a citizen has renounced U.S. citizenship to avoid 
taxes.116 The former provisions made administering the alternative tax 
regime difficult since it required the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to 
determine the subjective intent of taxpayers who wished to expatriate.117 
The 2004 Jobs Act replaces the subjective test established by the HIPAA 
amendments to section 877 by establishing a presumption of tax-
avoidance.118 
Similar to HIPAA, the 2004 Jobs Act subjects the taxpayer to the alter-
native tax regime for the ten years following renunciation of citizenship 
if the taxpayer meets certain requirements.119 If the individual’s average 
annual net income tax for the five taxable years prior to the date of the 
loss of U.S. citizenship is greater than $124,000,120 the net worth of the 
individual is $2,000,000 or more,121 or the individual either fails to make 
                                                                                                             
 112. See I.R.C. § 7701(n) (as added by the 2004 Jobs Act). See also infra Part III.B.2; 
2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 208–10. 
 113. See I.R.C. § 877(g) (as added by the 2004 Jobs Act). See also infra Part III.B.3; 
2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 210–12. 
 114. See supra note 94–95 and accompanying text for requirements for an information 
statement under I.R.C. § 6039G. 
 115. I.R.C. § 6039G (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). See infra Part III.B.4; see 
also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 213–15. 
 116. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 205–08. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See 2004 Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804(a)(1)–(2). The HIPAA amend-
ments to section 877 only established tax-avoidance as a principle purpose of expatriation 
if certain factors were established by the IRS. The principal purpose of tax-avoidance 
could also be rebutted by numerous exceptions. See supra Part II.D. 
 119. I.R.C. § 877(a)(1) (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 120. Id. § 877(a)(2)(A). 
 121. Id. § 877(a)(2)(B). 
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certain certifications122 or fails to submit evidence of compliance as the 
Secretary may require,123 then the individual will be taxed under the al-
ternative tax regime.124 Unlike the HIPAA amendments, if the monetary 
thresholds described above are met, the 2004 Jobs Act applies the alter-
native tax regime of I.R.C. section 877 unless the former citizen meets 
certain exceptions.125 The 2004 Jobs Act also lessens the number of ex-
ceptions available to avoid the alternative tax regime.126 There are only 
two exceptions recognized which allow an expatriate to escape the mone-
tary thresholds before imposition of the alternative tax regime.127 The 
individual must either be a dual citizen or a “certain minor.”128 
Dual citizenship for purposes of the 2004 Jobs Act changed from the 
definition employed by HIPAA.129 Dual citizenship, as defined by the 
2004 Jobs Act, is any individual who became at birth a citizen of both 
the United States and another country, continues to be a citizen of such 
other country, and has had no substantial contacts with the United 
States.130 An individual will be treated as having no substantial contacts 
with the United States only if the individual (i) was never a resident of 
the United States (as defined in section 7701(b)),131 (ii) has never held a 
                                                                                                             
 122. The individual must certify under penalty of perjury that he or she has met the 
requirements set out in the 2004 Jobs Act for the five preceding taxable years. Id. § 
877(a)(2)(C). 
 123. Id. 
 124. I.R.C. § 877(a)(1)–(2). 
 125. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 9. See also 2004 Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
357, § 804. HIPAA only established a rebuttable purpose of tax avoidance upon satisfac-
tion of certain factors. See supra Part II.C. 
 126. See generally I.R.C. § 877(c) (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). The number of 
exceptions available in the past has been seen as a major point of inefficiency of I.R.C.   
§ 877. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 204–10. 
 127. The two exceptions are dual citizenship and minority. I.R.C. § 877(c) (as 
amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 130. See I.R.C. § 877(c)(2)(A) (as amended by 2004 Jobs Act). In addition, an individ-
ual is considered a dual citizen under HIPAA when such individual becomes (not later 
than the close of a reasonable period after loss of U.S. citizenship) a citizen of the country 
in which: such individual was born; if such individual is married, such individual’s 
spouse was born; or either of such individual’s parents were born. I.R.C. § 
877(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(III) (as amended by HIPAA). 
 131. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1) defines resident alien and nonresident alien. In general, a 
resident alien individual shall be treated as a resident of the United States with respect to 
any calendar year if (and only if) such individual: (i) is a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States at any time during such calendar year; (ii) meets the substantial presence 
test of paragraph (3); or (iii) makes the first year election. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A). An indi-
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U.S. passport, and (iii) was not present in the United States for more than 
thirty days during any calendar year for each of the ten calendar years 
preceding the individual’s loss of U.S. citizenship.132 
The second exception allows “certain minors” to avoid the alternative 
tax regime.133 An individual qualifies as a “certain minor” if he or she 
became at birth a citizen of the United States, neither parent of such indi-
vidual was a citizen of the United States at the time of such birth, the 
individual’s loss of U.S. citizenship occurs before such individual attains 
the age of eighteen and a half years, and the individual was not present in 
the United States for more than thirty days during any calendar year for 
each of the ten calendar years preceding the individual’s loss of U.S. citi-
zenship.134 
2. Tax-Based Rules For Determining Date of Expatriation 
The 2004 Jobs Act amends the definitions set out in I.R.C. section 
7701 by adding a new subsection. The new subsection (n) states that an 
individual who wishes to be treated as a nonresident noncitizen of the 
United States shall continue to be treated as a citizen or resident of the 
United States until the individual (1) gives notice of an expatriating act135 
or termination of residency to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, and (2) provides an information statement in accor-
dance with I.R.C. section 6039G.136 The Joint Committee submitted this 
recommendation to Congress because a former citizen could previously 
                                                                                                             
vidual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizenship of the United States 
nor a resident of the United States (within the meaning of subparagraph(A). Id. 
§7701(b)(1)(B). See also id. § 7701(b)(2) (codifying special rules for first and last year of 
residency). 
 132. See id. § 877(c)(2)(B) (as amended by 2004 Jobs Act). 
 133. Id. § 877(c)(3). 
 134. See id. § 877(c)(3)(A)–(D). To achieve uniformity, the 2004 Jobs Act also 
amends I.R.C. § 2107(a) which applies to estate taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2101, 2107, 
2501 for taxation of estates. The Joint Committee recommended changes to the estate tax 
provisions dealing with expatriates because of the difficulty of enforcement by the IRS. 
See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 104. This lack of enforcement is due to the lack 
of information the IRS had access to regarding former citizens. Id. 
 135. See supra Part II.B for the statutory requirements for giving notice of an expatri-
ating act. 
 136. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(n) (as added by 2004 Jobs Act); id. § 6039G. See also 
supra note 95 and accompanying text relating to section 6039G of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986. 
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convert his or her federal tax status to that of a nonresident noncitizen 
without notifying the IRS.137 
3. Imposition of Full U.S. Taxation Liability 
As recommended by the Joint Committee on Taxation, Congress added 
a new subsection to I.R.C. section 877 which defines “physical pres-
ence.”138 The new subsection (g) generally subjects an expatriate to full 
U.S. taxation if the individual returns to the United States for more than 
thirty days during any taxable year in which the individual is subject to 
the alternative tax.139 There is, of course, an exception.140 An individual 
can disregard counting up to thirty days of “physical presence” within 
the United States in any calendar year if the individual is in the United 
States to perform services for their employer and the individual either 
has ties to another country or has minimal prior physical presence in the 
United States.141 The exception does not apply, however, if the individual 
is related to the employer or fails to meet requirements determined by the 
Secretary to prevent the avoidance of U.S. tax liability.142 
The purpose of this amendment is to deter an individual who wishes to 
expatriate to avoid U.S. taxes but wishes to retain significant ties to their 
interests in the United States.143 By shortening the periods allowed before 
imposition of full U.S. taxation, the drafters of the amendment hoped to 
catch taxpatriates while not unduly interfering with individuals who truly 
wish to sever all ties with the United States.144 
4. Annual Information Return-Filing Requirement 
The 2004 Jobs Act amends section 6039G of the I.R.C. to ease the ad-
ministrative burden of enforcing the alternative tax by imposing stricter 
                                                                                                             
 137. Under previous law, the INA governed the determination of when a U.S. citizen 
was treated for U.S. federal tax purposes as having relinquished citizenship. INA § 1481. 
See also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 209 n.585. Additionally, the information 
form requirement under I.R.C. § 877 (as amended by HIPAA) did not require that the 
individual renouncing U.S. citizenship give the information to the IRS on the form itself. 
It only required information be given to the Department of State. As a consequence, the 
IRS has had many difficulties receiving timely information to help administer the alterna-
tive tax regime. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 81, 209. 
 138. See 2004 Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804(c). 
 139. See I.R.C. § 877(g)(1) (as added by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 140. See id. § 877(g)(2). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 210–12. 
 144. See id. 
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requirements and a higher frequency for filing information statements.145 
As amended by the 2004 Jobs Act, I.R.C. section 6039G now requires an 
annual information filing directly to the IRS,146 as well as information 
regarding the annual income, assets and liabilities, and information re-
garding the number of days the former citizen was physically present in 
the United States for each taxable year.147 Previously, section 6039G 
only required former citizens to file an information statement if they 
owed U.S. federal income tax.148 The new amendments are meant to give 
the IRS more information regarding the relocation activities of former 
citizens, as well as more information regarding income generated by as-
sets, and any dispositions of assets that would result in the imposition of 
U.S. taxes.149 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Weakness of the HIPAA Alternative Tax Regime 
As previously discussed, the problem of taxpatriation can be attributed 
to the United States’ system of worldwide taxation and its high tax 
rates.150 The 2004 Jobs Act is designed to help abate tax-motivated expa-
triation.151 Congress identified five desirable purposes to guide revisions 
                                                                                                             
 145. See also supra Part II.C.1. 
 146. I.R.C. § 6039G(a) (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 147. Id. §§ 6039G(b)(5)–(6). The amendment also removed the monetary threshold the 
former citizen had to reach before providing information regarding their assets and li-
abilities. See I.R.C. § 6039G(b) (as amended by HIPAA). 
 148. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 213–14. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Daniel J. Mitchell, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would 
Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 18, 
2000, at 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1395.cfm (last vis-
ited Mar. 6, 2006). Although this article focuses on the impact of tax havens and the relo-
cation of assets offshore, it can be likened to the problem of expatriation to avoid taxes. 
The same tax havens where offshore capital is sheltered and kept private are where for-
mer citizens attain new citizenship. See id. Although U.S. tax rates are considered high 
when compared to the tax rates of countries where former U.S. citizens have now attained 
citizenship, they are considered low compared to the other industrialized nations of the 
European Union. Id. 
 151. As previously discussed, 2004 Jobs Act amends HIPAA. HIPAA itself was en-
acted due to prior ineffective legislation such as the Foreign Investors Act of 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-809; the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369; and the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 and was in response to the Joint Committee on 
Taxation’s report in 1995 regarding its findings on the treatment of expatriates. 2003 JCT 
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of inadequate provisions prescribed by section 877.152 The five goals that 
the alternative tax regime seek to accomplish are: (1) to express official 
disapproval of tax-motivated expatriation; (2) to deter or punish tax-
motivated expatriation; (3) to remove unintended tax incentives from 
expatriation; (4) to tax appreciation and asset value that accrue while a 
person is a U.S. citizen or resident; and (5) to ensure that individuals 
cannot enjoy any tax benefits that may arise from expatriating while 
maintaining significant ties to the United States.153 Although intended to 
deter tax-motivated expatriation and remedy the shortcomings of section 
877 (as amended by HIPAA),154 Congress has yet to pass legislation to 
adequately address the problem of taxpatriation and offer a solution.155 
These amended provisions fall short of achieving the five Congressional 
goals156 and, as with the HIPAA amendments, essentially represent a ti-
ger with no teeth.157 
                                                                                                             
Report, supra note 45, 76–81. See generally 1995 Joint Committee Tax Report, supra 
note 46. 
 152. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 75. These purposes were found by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation and also included a sixth purpose—to achieve a combina-
tion of and variations of the other five purposes. Id. 
 153. Id. These purposes are identified as important because Congress primarily in-
tended the alternative tax regime to be “neutral.”  Id. Neutrality of the alternative tax 
regime means that Congress wanted to eliminate the possible tax incentives in renouncing 
citizenship. Id. 
 154. See H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. pmbl. (2d Sess. 2004) (proposing the bill “to amend 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to remove impediments in such Code. . . .”). See also 
2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 103–39. Examples of shortcomings are loopholes 
caused by an abundance of exceptions available to remove a former citizen from the 
reach of the alternative tax regime, the inability of the IRS to establish a former citizen’s 
intent to avoid taxes, and the under-enforcement of the alternative tax regime. Id. 
 155. Although the future impact of the 2004 Jobs Act amendments have yet to play 
out, a look at the past serves as a prediction of its inadequacy. Like the HIPAA amend-
ments to I.R.C. section 877, the amendments from the 2004 Jobs Act also have problems 
with enforceability and ease of administration. See infra Part III.B. See also Brigid 
McMenamin, Home Free, FORBES, July 26, 1999, at 110. See generally Liu, supra note 
32; Kirsch, supra note 14; Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination 
of Taxdriven Expatriation by United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 VA. TAX 
REV. 75 (2000). 
 156. For reasons discussed infra Part III.B, the amended provisions of the 2004 Jobs 
Act, although remedying some inadequacies of the HIPAA amendments, do not offer the 
best solution to deter tax-motivated expatriation. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 
75 (finding that the alternative tax regime would not be the most effective regime to re-
duce tax-motivated expatriation). See also id. app. 26.3 (Letter from Jonathan Talisman, 
Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury to Lindy Paull, 
Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, dated May 5, 2000) stating that problems 
inherent in the current law cannot fully be addressed through the mere modification of the 
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In a letter to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Treasury Depart-
ment found that for the United States’ worldwide system of taxation, a 
mark-to-market regime would more effectively deter taxpatriation, be a 
more appropriate and administrable method of taxing expatriates, and 
would eliminate many of the problems inherent under section 877.158 The 
Treasury Department’s recommended mark-to-market regime would 
                                                                                                             
existing regime). See also McMenamin, supra note 155. The HIPAA provisions do not 
seem to have deterred tax-motivated expatriation. Under I.R.C. § 6039G(d), the Secretary 
is required to publish the names of individuals who have been determined to have expa-
triated to avoid taxes. The names of 2,735 former citizens were published in the Federal 
Register between 1995 to 1999. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 122. 
  So far, 346 names have been published for 2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 23295 (May 4, 
2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 68511 (Nov. 10, 2005); 71 Fed. Reg. 6312 (Feb. 7, 2006). The 
names for the quarter ending June 30, 2005 have not yet been released as of the publica-
tion of this Note. For 2004, 631 names were published in the Federal Register. 69 Fed. 
Reg. 61907–08 (Oct. 21, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 61908–09 (Oct. 21, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 
61909–10 (Oct. 21, 2004); 70 Fed. Reg. 5511 (Feb. 2, 2005). For 2003, 471 names were 
published in the Federal Register. 68 Fed. Reg. 23180 (Apr. 30, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 
44840–01 (July 30, 2003); 69 Fed. Reg. 61906–07 (Oct. 21, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 61910–
11 (Oct. 21, 2004). In 2002, 504 names were published in the Federal Register. 67 Fed. 
Reg. 19621 (Apr. 22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 47889–90 (July 22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 66456 
(Oct. 31, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 4549–51 (Jan. 29, 2003). In 2001, 491 names were pub-
lished in the Federal Register. 66 Fed. Reg. 48915 (Sept. 25, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 48912 
(Sept. 24, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 11375 (Mar. 13, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 11374 (Mar.13, 
2002). In 2000, 431 names were published in the Federal Register. 65 Fed. Reg. 3542326 
(June 2, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 5005051 (Aug. 16, 2000); 66 Fed. Reg. 8049495 (Dec. 21, 
2000); 66 Fed. Reg. 4891315 (Sept. 24, 2001). These numbers are only for the number of 
individuals with respect to whom the Secretary receives information about and deter-
mines to have renounced United States citizenship within the meaning of I.R.C. § 877 (as 
amended by HIPAA) which included numerous exceptions. I.R.C. § 877(c). 
 157. See McMenamin, supra note 155, at 110 (quoting tax and estate lawyer F. Bentley 
Mooney in describing the effectiveness of the HIPAA amendments). The weaknesses 
described regarding HIPAA also apply to the Reed Amendment which bars a former 
citizen from re-entering the United States since the IRS has never enforced this provision. 
Id. See generally Carter, supra note 50 (arguing that the Reed Amendment is unconstitu-
tional). Additionally, many individuals do not even formally renounce citizenship, believ-
ing they can evade the bar on visiting the United States. McMenamin, supra note 155, at 
110. 
 158. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, app. 26. Other bills before Congress included S. 
260, 108th Cong. (2003), which introduced a mark-to-market regime and S. 1054, 108th 
Cong. § 340 (2003), which also introduced a mark-to-market regime. This is not the first 
time Congress has rejected realization. Even amid the Clinton Administration’s support 
of a this type of system, the 104th Congress rejected proposals in both the Senate and 
House of Representatives that introduced mark-to-market regimes for taxing expatriates 
because it was seen as an “exit tax” like the one imposed by the former Soviet Union. See 
Liu, supra note 32, at 701. 
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have imposed tax liabilities at the time a wealthy expatriate leaves the 
U.S. tax jurisdiction.159 The tax base for this “exit tax” would have in-
cluded foreign assets and focused on unrealized gains accrued during 
citizenship.160 While recognizing that a better tax system existed, the 
Treasury Department nonetheless made recommendations to improve the 
alternative tax regime if Congress chose to do so.161 Congress did choose 
to retain the alternative tax regime162 and followed most of the recom-
mendations of the Joint Committee on Taxation when amending the al-
ternative tax in an attempt to increase its effectiveness.163 Congress made 
this decision despite the Treasury Department’s determination that “mere 
modifications” to the alternative tax system could not fully address in-
herent problems with the current law,164 and that alternative avenues of 
taxation would be more effective in deterring tax-motivated expatria-
tion.165 
                                                                                                             
 159. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, apps. 26.3–26.4 (Letter from Jonathon Talis-
man). 
 160. Id. Gains accrued while a U.S. citizen represent unrealized gains. The United 
States only taxes gains which are “realized.”  See I.R.C. § 61(a) (definition of income); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960) (taxable income includes income realized in any form, 
whether in money, property, or services); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) 
(holding that a taxpayer who received a stock-split was not subject to taxation on the 
additional shares of stock because the taxpayer’s proportion of the corporation remained 
the same and did not have a greater ability to pay the tax). See also I.R.C. §§ 7190 (items 
specifically included in income); id. §§ 101–40 (Items specifically excluded from in-
come). The realization requirement is illustrated by the rules for calculating gains from 
property. For property, gain equals amount realized minus basis. Basis equals the cost of 
the property and the amount realized equals money received from the sale or disposition 
of property plus the fair market value of property (other than money) received. Id. § 
61(a)(3) (gain from property equals income); id. § 1001(a) (definition of basis); id. § 
1001(b) (definition of amount realized). 
 161. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, app. 26.4 (Letter from Jonathon Talisman). 
 162. See I.R.C. § 877(b) (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act) (alternative tax). 
 163. Compare I.R.C. § 877 (as amended by the 2004 Jobs Act), with 2003 JCT Report, 
supra note 45, pt. XI. 
 164. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, app. 26.1 (Letter from John Talisman: Question 
30). 
 165. Such other measures include either imposing a mark-to-market system or simpli-
fying the tax code. Id. See also supra note 106; H.R. 269, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing 
to simplify the current tax code). President George W. Bush has set reforming the tax 
code as one of his goals during his second term. Howard Gleckman, Three Roads to Re-
form: A Bush Panel Homes in on Ways to Make Taxes Fairer and Simpler, BUS. WEEK, 
Aug. 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 11830849. President Bush appointed an advisory 
panel to provide recommendations for making the tax code simpler, fairer and more con-
ducive for economic growth. Id. Among other things, the panel recommended the elimi-
nation of the alternative minimum tax. Edmund L. Andrews, Your Taxes; Tax Reform 
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B. Weaknesses and Strengths of the 2004 Jobs Act 
1. Objective Rules for Determining Applicability of the  
Alternative Tax Regime 
Passed in response to the Joint Committee’s hearings and recommen-
dations, the 2004 Jobs Act addressed some of the concerns regarding the 
difficulty in administering section 877 (as amended by HIPAA) due to its 
subjective nature and its numerous exceptions.166 Primarily, the 2004 
Jobs Act presumes a principal purpose of tax-avoidance when an indi-
vidual expatriates, if the individual meets the objective monetary stan-
dards.167 The 2004 Jobs Act amendments also reduced the number of 
exceptions that allow a former citizen to escape the alternative tax re-
gime from four to two.168 The increased chance of being placed in the 
alternative tax regime should act as a further deterrent from taxpatriating 
since there are fewer loopholes. However, though arguably less so, the 
prior weaknesses associated with the alternative tax regime are still pre-
sent. Even if an individual is determined to have taxpatriated and is sub-
jected to the alternative tax regime, the problems of enforcement and 
                                                                                                             
Looking for a Passing Lane, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
2041238. Congress has only had a lukewarm reception to Bush’s proposals and reform-
ing the tax code seems a distance prospect. Mark E. Battersby, Coming Soon: More Cir-
cular 230 Amendments, INVESTMENT NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
18677586. Many conservative Republicans want to switch to a consumption based tax 
system. Edmund L. Andrews, Economic View; Echoes of 1986?  Not in Bush’s Tax 
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17931938. Bush’s proposals 
do, however, include an end to worldwide taxation for corporate profits. Jeffrey H. Birn-
baum, Commission Proposes Overhaul of Tax System, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 17661723. 
 166. See generally I.R.C. § 877 (as amended by HIPAA). 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24. 
 168. Compare HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 511(b), with 2004 Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-357, § 804(a)(2). See also supra note 126 and accompanying text. Additionally, it is 
striking that these are the only exceptions available to long-term residents. These excep-
tions seem to only except “accidental” Americans from the alternative tax. Farkins-
DiNardo supra note 71, at 33. In contrast, long-term residents seek to establish a close 
connection with the United States and therefore would not qualify for the exceptions. See 
id. An argument exists as to whether it is even fair to subject residents to the alternative 
tax let alone not provide exceptions comparable to those available to U.S. citizens since 
long-term residents in general choose not to gain U.S. citizenship and have not com-
pletely divested themselves of their former identity with another country. One could ar-
gue that the exceptions are only applicable to U.S. citizens who seemingly did not choose 
citizenship and have stayed away but on the other hand, long-term residents chose not to 
become citizens and did not avail themselves of the full benefits available to U.S. citi-
zens. See also id. at 33–34, 36. 
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effectiveness remain. If a former citizen is patient or has foreign assets, 
which are outside the reach of section 877, he or she can escape much of 
the U.S. tax burden.169 In short, while the new objective standards theo-
retically deter tax-motivated expatriation170 and express official disap-
proval, they neither remove unintended tax incentives from expatriation 
nor tax appreciation and asset value accrued during citizenship or resi-
dency.171 
2. Tax-Based Rules For Determining Date of Expatriation 
The new subsection (n) of I.R.C. section 7701 (as added by the 2004 
Jobs Act) establishes special rules for when an individual is no longer a 
U.S. citizen or long-term resident.172 It tries to ensure that former citizens 
will not be able to renounce citizenship and enjoy the tax benefits of non-
resident noncitizens without informing the IRS.173 However, new subsec-
tion (n) does not address the treatment of former citizens who simply 
leave without formally renouncing citizenship to avoid the alternative tax 
regime.174 Subsection (n) does not put in place a procedure to catch those 
individuals who try to quietly slip away.175 Although subsection (n) re-
quires filing of an information statement, an individual can avoid imposi-
                                                                                                             
 169. See Liu, supra note 32, at 699. See generally 2004 Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 
§ 804 (amending only subsections (a) and (c) of I.R.C. § 877 (as amended by HIPAA) 
and not subsection (d) which lists the source rules of income and gain taxed by the alter-
native tax regime). See also 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 204.  It also taxes the 
resources of the IRS to monitor tax-motivated expatriates for a period as long as ten 
years. 
 170. Since these are new standards, we will have to wait to see if the new amendments 
to section 877 actually deter expatriation. But looking at past trends, it does not look 
likely. 
 171. The goal of ensuring that individuals cannot enjoy the tax benefits of expatriating 
while maintaining significant ties to the United States (goal number five discussed supra 
note 107 and accompanying text) is not applicable here since it does not regulate physical 
presence of a former citizen in the United States. See generally § 877(a), (c) (as amended 
by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 172. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 173. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 209. 
 174. See Beckett G. Cantley, Taxation Expatriation: Will the FAST Act Stop Wealthy 
Americans From Leaving the United States?, 36 AKRON L. REV. 221, 238 n.95 (2003). 
Cantley states that “after the last attempt to legislatively deter tax expatriation, many tax 
expatriates deliberately lost their citizenship without formally renouncing it, believing 
that was a simple way to avoid the legislation.”  Id. 
 175. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(n) (as added by the 2004 Jobs Act). 
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tion of the alternative tax regime by failing to file.176 Furthermore, the 
new tax-based rules for determining expatriation do not address the main 
concerns seen by the IRS and the Treasury Department.177 Primarily, the 
unaddressed concerns include patient expatriates selling assets after the 
ten year alternative tax period, the non-taxation of foreign assets, and the 
labor intensive process of monitoring expatriates for ten years after a de-
termination of tax avoidance.178 
3. Imposition of Full U.S. Taxation Liability 
Not all changes made by the 2004 Jobs Act are ineffective. The addi-
tion of subsection (g) to I.R.C. section 877 furthers the Congressional 
goal of ensuring that individuals cannot enjoy any tax benefits that may 
arise from expatriating while maintaining significant ties to the United 
States. Subsection (g) subjects a former citizen to full U.S. taxation if he 
or she spends more than thirty days in any calendar year within the 
United States.179 This way, only those who truly wish to expatriate, sever 
considerable ties with the United States, and re-establish or strengthen 
ties with another country will avoid getting caught in the net of section 
877(g).180 
                                                                                                             
 176. See Kirsch, supra note 14, at 905–06. When coupled with the effects of the Reed 
Amendment, discussed supra note 56, an individual, even if willing to pay the taxes im-
posed by I.R.C. section 877, may be motivated to avoid the alternative tax regime by not 
filing a tax return to decrease his or her chances of being denied entry because the indi-
vidual was deemed to have expatriated for tax-motivated purposes. 
 177. See generally 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 103–25 (Part VIII: Effective-
ness of Present Law Treatment of Citizenship Relinquishment and Resident Termina-
tion). 
 178. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, app. 27 (Letter from Charles Rosotti, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, to Lindy Paull, Chair of the Joint Committee on Taxation, dated May 
5, 2000). 
 179. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (the fifth goal established by Con-
gress). Subsection (g) defines “physical presence” and shortens the amount of time a 
nonresident noncitizen can be present in the United States without being subject to U.S. 
taxes. See supra note 141 and accompanying text regarding the exceptions to counting 
days of physical presence with the United States. 
 180. But see Farkins-DiNardo supra note 71, at 42 (arguing thirty days is not enough 
to establish a requisite connection for imposition of full U.S. tax liability). However, this 
fails to consider that the requirement is for former citizens who did not qualify for an 
exception due to their ties with the United States, and who still continue to maintain ties 
to the United States requiring presence within the United States for more than thirty days. 
See also supra Part II.D.3 for exceptions to the thirty day rule. 
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4. Annual Information Return-Filing Requirement 
The amendment to section 6039G of the I.R.C. provides more informa-
tion to the IRS by facilitating inter-agency exchange. The requirement of 
filing an annual return may alleviate one of the main problems of admin-
istering the alternative tax for ten years after the date of expatriation be-
cause it will ease the labor required to find information regarding trans-
actions in which the former citizen is currently engaged.181 
C. A Mark-to-Market Regime 
Tax-motivated expatriation is born from the unequal treatment of non-
resident noncitizens as compared to citizens and residents182 and the re-
alization principle.183 The combination of these two policy decisions cre-
ates the temptation for affluent citizens to discard their citizenship and 
exploit the differing tax treatment before they realize gains on prop-
erty.184 Ideally, a system to curb expatriation should effectively remedy 
these issues by removing the benefits. The principal benefits of taxpatria-
tion are the non-taxation of unrealized gains185 on foreign assets and the 
lower tax rate afforded to nonresident noncitizens of U.S. assets.186 
Therefore, if the United States treats assets of former citizens as being 
“realized,” and subject to U.S. taxation before expatriation becomes offi-
cial, the benefits of taxpatriation are greatly reduced. 
                                                                                                             
 181. This is assuming that the former citizen will adhere to the rules established by 
I.R.C. § 6039G. If the former citizen does not file information statements with the IRS 
after expatriating, U.S. courts may not be able to establish personal jurisdiction over non-
citizens outside the territorial borders of the United States if the former citizen no longer 
has “minimum contacts” with the United States. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945) and progeny. See generally William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law 
Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002) (stating foreign courts routinely refuse to enforce 
foreign public law). 
 182. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See also infra notes 185, 187. 
 184. The differing tax treatment also includes differing estate tax treatment which is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
 185. An “unrealized gain” is a gain where there is still uncertainty as to whether there 
will be a definite gain or loss. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) (where the tax-
payer sold shares in an ore mine in exchange for a sum of money, less than their basis, 
plus the promise of future income based on the amount of ore produced. The court held 
the gain as “unrealized” and the transaction as still open due to the uncertainty of gain or 
loss). See also infra note 188 (discussion of basis). 
 186. I.R.C. § 871  The United States does not impose a capital gains tax on nonresident 
noncitizens. See Abreu, supra note 8, at 1106 (“[A]dvantages of expatriation are . . . the 
result of the operation of a tax system that combines the realization requirement with a 
virtual exemption from tax for appreciation in foreign capital.”). 
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To effectuate neutrality in the tax system, the United States should re-
place the alternative tax regime with a mark-to-market regime. This 
would deem a former citizen’s accrued but unrealized gains on property 
as “realized” or marked to market, and therefore taxable, on the date the 
individual seeks to renounce citizenship.187 While more effective than the 
alternative tax regime, this solution is not without controversy.188 How-
ever, modifying a pure realization system to alleviate some of the harsh 
results from realizing unrealized gains could produce a more effective, as 
well as fairer, system.189 
Marking to market would require an individual to pay taxes on any un-
realized gains above a certain threshold amount (i.e., $1 million) before 
renunciation of citizenship becomes effective.190 Only taxing unrealized 
gains above the threshold amount would allay the perceived unfairness of 
realizing these accrued gains.191 A reasonable threshold amount would 
                                                                                                             
 187. “Realizing gains” or marking property to market means treating the asset as if it 
were sold for its fair market value on the date the individual renounces citizenship and 
taxes the alleged gain on the property. See supra note 160 for a discussion of “realiza-
tion.” 
 188. See Abreu, supra note 8, at 1146–47 (arguing that realizing gains on assets poses 
a problem to taxpayers because it forces them to determine the basis of their assets). In 
spite of its difficulty, this places the burden on the individual taxpayer who desires to 
expatriate rather than on the IRS. Furthermore, conflicts which arise regarding the calcu-
lation of basis fall within the regular auditing duties of the IRS and do not require using 
special resources. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 361 (1993) (illustrating Canada’s system of using a National Appraisal Date to de-
termine the basis of property at death. Canadian officials reported only slight difficulty 
with calculating basis). “Basis” is needed to determine “Adjusted Basis” which deter-
mines the amount of gain or loss. See I.R.C. § 1001 (determination of amount and recog-
nition of gain or loss), § 1011 (adjusted basis for determining gain or loss), § 1016 (ad-
justments to basis). “Basis” is generally the cost of the asset. I.R.C. § 1012. See also 
I.R.C. § 1014 (basis of property acquired by descent), § 1015 (basis of property acquired 
by gift and transfers in trust). Another issue which may arise from realizing unrealized 
gains is the dispute over valuation of an asset. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 
198–99. However, this also comes under the regular duties of the IRS and does not re-
quire additional resources. 
 189. But see Farkins-DiNardo, supra note 71, at 40 (arguing that taxing gains on the 
date of expatriation avoids the problem of double taxation). Even assuming this is true, 
applying a straight mark-to-market approach is harsh. The mark-to-market approach 
should be modified to provide a way to deal with illiquidity. See infra note 192 and ac-
companying text. 
 190. See supra Part II.B for a discussion on the procedure to renounce U.S. citizenship. 
 191. One of the reasons for requiring a tax only on gains that are realized is that the 
gains are tangible. Without realization, there is uncertainty as to whether the asset will 
produce a gain at all. Burnet, 283 U.S. at 413. 
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also be more likely to catch wealthy Americans with an incentive to tax-
patriate, while allowing average Americans with less of a tax-motivated 
incentive to escape the tax. The individual would be taxed on those ac-
crued gains above a threshold amount and subject to the same progres-
sive rates as during citizenship. 
Another issue raised by implementing a realization regime is the tax-
payer’s liquidity.192 If most of the taxpatriate’s wealth is derived from 
those unrealized gains, then the taxpayer may have difficulty paying the 
tax assessed. One way to alleviate this problem is to allow, at the option 
of the taxpayer, installment or deferred payments.193 In either situation, 
the IRS will most likely also need to receive a security interest in collat-
eral located in the United States to assure payment of the tax. 
As stated, the realization regime would further many Congressional 
purposes as well as eliminate many problems stemming from the alterna-
tive tax regime.194 For instance, one of the primary defects in the alterna-
tive tax regime is the difficulty in administration. Requiring the IRS to 
monitor former citizens determined to have expatriated to avoid taxes for 
ten years after the date of expatriation is a substantial task.195 The pro-
posed realization regime would eliminate the need to monitor former 
citizens because the taxable gain on property will have been paid. This 
furthers the Congressional goal of administrative ease by creating a one 
time tax event for the IRS to administer instead of ten annual ones as 
required by the alternative tax.196 Taxing gains before an individual expa-
triates also solves the lack of information dilemma for the IRS since the 
individual will still be present in the United States to provide it. 
                                                                                                             
 192. 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 199. The term liquidity refers to the tax-
payer’s ability to pay the tax using cash or cash equivalents. 
 193. With interest accruing on unpaid taxes. 
 194. Canada and Australia impose an “exit tax” on former residents. Australia subjects 
individuals to a capital gains tax (CGT) upon the happening of a CGT Event. A CGT 
Event includes when an individual “stop[s] being an Australian resident.”  Australian 
Taxation Office, Introduction to Capital Gains Tax for Individuals, http://www.ato. 
gov.au/individuals/content.asp?doc=/content/20427.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
Canada taxes individuals who leave Canada to settle in another country and sever their 
residential ties. Canada Revenue Agency, International and Non-Resident Individuals—
Leaving Canada, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/individuals/leaving-e.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
 195. See 2003 JCT Report, supra note 45, at 122–25. 
 196. Another benefit is that the IRS does not have to deal with information statements 
required by I.R.C. § 6039G and the calculation of days of physical presence under I.R.C. 
§ 877(g). 
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The realization regime furthers the Congressional goal of taxing appre-
ciation and asset value of property while an individual is a citizen. Since 
property is deemed “realized” for individuals who wish to expatriate, any 
gain in value will be taxed.197 Additionally, the realization tax removes 
any unintended incentives to expatriation caused by the U.S. tax code 
and promotes tax neutrality for expatriation by realizing gains upon ex-
patriation. This way, it is more likely that only those with pure desires to 
expatriate will do so. Lastly, the realization regime would also accom-
plish Congress’s goals of expressing official disapproval and deterring 
tax-motivated expatriation.198 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Taxation is a complex machine with many interrelated parts. One com-
ponent will undoubtedly affect the performance of another. On occasion, 
the interaction of our system of taxation and the rules used by our society 
to accomplish certain policy objectives creates undesirable loopholes. 
Expatriation, when used as a tool to avoid taxation, is one such example. 
It offers an escape from taxation on gains accrued during a citizen’s life-
time because of a combination of the realization principle and the differ-
ent treatment afforded foreigners. 
In the quest for a solution, Congress developed the alternative tax. The 
alternative tax regime in existence prior to the 2004 Jobs Act fell short of 
deterring tax-motivated expatriation. It was ineffective in many ways. 
First, the regime was difficult to administer and placed the burden of 
proving subjective intent to avoid taxes on the IRS. Additionally, there 
were many exceptions which negated the statutory presumption of tax-
motivated expatriation. Third, information regarding whether or not a 
citizen expatriated, and thus left the U.S. taxing jurisdiction, rarely 
reached the IRS. Finally, a patient expatriate could wait ten years and 
leave the alternative tax regime before realizing gains. 
By passing the 2004 Jobs Act, Congress tried to remedy these defi-
ciencies. Although solving a few inadequacies, many remained. For ex-
ample, a patient expatriate can still wait ten years before realizing gains. 
                                                                                                             
 197. If above the threshold amount suggested supra text accompanying notes 190–91. 
Taxing appreciation and asset value of property while an individual is a citizen is Con-
gress’s fourth goal. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of Con-
gressional goals. 
 198. See supra note 107. The accomplishment of these two goals is quite clear. The 
whole purpose in having a law subjecting an expatriate to a separate taxation regime is to 
deter the expatriation and act as a symbol of disapproval by the regulating body (i.e., 
Congress). 
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Also, although less difficult, the alternative tax is still administratively 
burdensome on the IRS. Furthermore, although more narrow, exceptions 
still remain to take an expatriate out of the alternative tax regime. 
With all the complexities and nuances the I.R.C. contains, the simplest 
and most effective technique for remedying a disapproved course of ac-
tion is to recognize the benefits of that action and promulgate legislation 
to directly counter it. To eradicate the benefits from taxpatriating, there 
should be a realization event which occurs at the time a former citizen 
attempts to renounce citizenship. Realizing these accrued gains elimi-
nates the desire to taxpatriate, yet does not interfere with those who truly 
wish to renounce their U.S. citizenship for that of another country. This 
mark-to-market system would also further many Congressional goals, 
such as deterrence, disapproval and administrative ease. To mitigate 
some of the harshness of a pure mark-to-market system, Congress should 
impose threshold amounts of gain before the tax is imposed. Moreover, 
Congress should allow deferred or installment payments to ease the tax-
payer’s potential lack of liquidity. Additionally, a mark-to-market system 
would combat one of the toughest inadequacies to remedy—a patient 
expatriate. Until a time when tax-motivated expatriation ceases to enrage 
the citizenry as unfairly benefiting the wealthy, the realistic option would 
be to change a flawed system. 
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